We consider a two-player partial-information game on a Markov chain, where each player attempts to minimize its own cost over a finite time horizon. We show that this game has always a Nash equilibrium in stochastic behavioral policies. The technique used to prove this result is constructive but has severe limitations because it involves solving an extremely large hi-matrix game. To alleviate this problem, we derive a dynamic-programming-like condition that is necessary and sufficient for a pair of policies to he a Nash equilibrium. This condition automatically gives Nash equilibria when a pair of "cost-twgo" functions can be found that satisfy certain inequalities.
Introduction
Competitive games are usually classified as either having full or partial-information.
In full-information games both players know the whole state of the game when they have t o make decisions. By state, we mean all information that is needed to completely describe the future evolution of the game, when the decision rules used by both players are known. Examples of fullinformation games include Chess, Checkers, and Go. Partial-information games differ from these in that at least one of the players does not know the whole state of the game. Poker, Bridge, and Hearts are examples of such games. In fuIl-information games, as a player is planning its next move, it only needs to hypothesize over its and the opponent's future moves to predict the possible outcomes of the game. Partial-information games are especially challenging because this reasoning may fail. In many partial-information games, a player must hypothesize not only on the future moves of both players, but also on the past moves of the o p ponent to predict the possible outcomes of the game. This often leads t o a tremendous increase in the complexity of the games. In general, partial-information stochastic games are poorly understood and the literature is relatively sparse. Notable exceptions are games with lack of information for one of the players [l, These correspond to iterated plays of the same static game, in which the payoff matrix is randomly chosen by "nature" and not known to the players (who can try t o estimate it based on the information collected at each Play).
In this paper, we address fairly general partialinformation games on Markov chains. These are games in which two players are able to influence the state transitions in a Markov chain by taking appropriate actions [14]. Each player attempts to minimize its own cost that is additive over time with the incremental costs depending on the state of the Markov chain and the actions taken by the players. We deviate from most of the literature on Markov games in that we do not assume full-information. In fact, each player only has available stochastic measurements that, in general, do not allow it to determine the current state of the Markov chain. We consider here finite games played over a finite time horizon and with possibly nonzero-sum costs. This paper contains two main contributions. We first show that there always exists a Nash equilibrium in the set of stochastic behavioral policies, thus extending Kuhn's result for extensive games with perfect recall 1151 t o the setting of partial-information Markov games. The second contribution consists in deriving a dynamic programming-like condition that, when satisfied by a pair of "cost-to-go" functions, provides a Nash equilibrium in stochastic behavioral policies. We show that this condition is non-conservative because it is also necessary for the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This paper falls short of actually providing an efficient algorithm t o determine the cost-to-go functions for a generic partial information game. This is an important topic for future research.
Notation: Let (i2,F) be the relevant measurable space.
Bold face symbols are used to denote random variables.
Consider a probability measure P : 3 + [0,1] and a random variable t : i2 + C. Given two events A, E E 3 with P(B) # 0, we write P(A1B) for the conditional probability of A given B, i.e., P(AIB) = P(A n E)/ P(E). Given c E C, 
is the transition probability function.
st+l is assumed to be conditionally independent of all other random variables at times smaller or equal to t, given st, ut and dt. Moreover, the initial state s (0) is supposed t o be independent of all the other random variables at time t = 0. Its probability distribution is denoted by j3 E [0, 1Is.
Observation probability. To choose their actions, measurements yt and at are available to players U and D, respectively, at time t E 7 . Here, the random variables yt and z t , t E 7 , take values in finite measurement spaces y and 2, respectively. yt is assumed to be conditionally independent of all the other random variables at times smaller or equal to t, given st. Similarly for zt. Moreover, the conditional distributions of yt and zt, given the current value of the state st, are assumed t o be stationary, i.e., P(yt = ylst = s ) = p,(y,s) and When the measurements available to the players are sufficient t o let them both know at each time instant t E 7 which is the current value realized by the state st with probability one, the game is said to be of fullinfomation. Games for which this does not happen are said to be of partial-information Stochastic Policies. Informally, a "policy" for one of the players is a rule the player uses to select which actions to take over the time horizon 7 . We consider here policies that are stochastic in that, a t every time t E 7 , each player selects an action over the action set according to some probability distribution. The policies considered are also behavioral in that the specific prob* bility distribution depends on the information collected The sets of stochastic and pure behavioral policies for player D are respectively denoted by II, and n,.
Stochastic behavioral policies are a generalization t o partial-information Markov games of the behavioral policies for multi-act extensive games [16] . The fact that the stochastic actions of the players are allowed to depend on their past actions is key to guaranteeing that a Nash equilibrium always exists for the game presented here, and is the analogous t o the "perfect recall" property in the extensive games setting [15] . Opting for specific stochastic policies corresponds to selecting a particular probability measure that is consistent with the distributions chosen for the control actions. In the following we use the subscript ,6 in the probability measure P to denote the probability measur: associated with p E II, and 6 E I I , . When an assertion holds true with respect to P,s independently of p E II,, or of 6 E II,, or of both p E II, and 6 E I I , , we use the notation P6, P,, or P, respectively. Similarly for the expected value operator E. According to this notation, the transition and observation probabilities, and the initial state distribution introduced earlier are independent of p and 6 .
When player U selects a stochastic behavioral policy p E II, and player D a policy 6 E II,, the two players are jointly selecting a probability measure in the family {P,6 : p E n,,6 E n,}. This family of probability measures has the property that P,(ut The coupling between the players' costs models situations where they are sharing a common environment and competing for the same resources. We suppose that each player tries t o best counteract the other player's action so as t o achieve a certain performance level irrespectively of the other player's choice. In the game of interest, this translates into the players selecting a pair of stochastic behavioral policies (pL,6*) E II, x U , for which 5F-6' 5 Ji60, Vp E nu, J,4,* 5 5,4,, v6 E n,.
The policies (p*, 6.) satisfying (1) are said t o constitute a Nash equilibrium (an stochastic behavioral policies).
Existence of Nash equilibria
It turns out that, if we restrict our attention t o pure policies, a Nash equilibrium in the sense of (1) may not exist. This is actually the reason why we consider the stochastic behavioral policies. In order to prove that Nash equilibria always exist in stochastic behavioral policies, we introduce another type of policies, called mixed policies, for which one can use standard arguments to show that an equilibrium exists. Mixed policies can be thought of as another method t o enlarge the set of pure policies which is well suited for games that are played repeatedly.
Suppose that both players do restrict their attention t o pure behavioral policies but they independently extract at random which policy to use according to some probability distribution over the sets of pure policies. This extraction is done before the game starts and the resulting game is therefore known as a prior commitment 
We proceed now t o prove the existence of Nash equilibria in stochastic behavioral policies. To achieve this, we need the following result:
Lemma 
where ( p , 6) E 11, x II, are stochastic policies given by p := L U ( p ) , 6 := LD(u).
Lemma 1 extends Kuhn's equivalence result between mixed and stochastic behavioral policies in extensive games with perfect recall to the Markov games setting.
To prove it we need t o introduce the following nota- 
# Y . This means that each term in the summation
on the right-hand side of (7) equals exactly one term in the summation in the left-hand side of the same equation (and vice-versa). Equation (6) proves that E" is a right-inverse of Lu, and hence that Lu is surjective. L D can be defined similarly to Lu in (5) and can be proven to be surjective. We are now ready t o prove that (4) This, together with (lo), show that both IFu and J[6 are -equal to the right-hand side of (9). The proof that Jfu = J,$ is analogous.
We next state and prove the main result of this section: 
is a Nash equilibrium in stochastic policies.
Proof of Theorem 1. We start by proving the first inequality in (1). By contradiction assume that there is a policy p E II, for which J,".6. > Ji6*. Since the map Lu is surjective, there must exist some p E [0, lInu such that p = Lu(p). From Ji.6* > J$ and Lemma 1, one then concludes that .$o. > j:u., which violates (2).
The second inequality in (1) is proved similarly. rn
Since there always exists one Nash equilibrium in mixed policies, from Theorem 1 it follows that there always exists at least one Nash equilibrium in stochastic policies. Moreover, Theorem 1 gives a procedure to actually compute the corresponding stochastic policies, though the hi-matrix game to be solved can be extremely large.
Dynamic Programming Approach
In this section we look for a necessary and sufficient condition for a pair of stochastic behavioral policies Ep,a [ z T = t l u (~, , u T , d , ,~) The cost J:& associated with a pair of policies p E nU,6 E I I D can be easily computed from V;. Indeed, from the fact that the probability distribution of yo is independent of the policies p and 6, we conclude that
(13)
We shall see next that it is possible to compute 72 using the operator qy, from the set of functionals V u := {V : y* + Et} into itself, defined for each Y E Y. by 
T:6v(y) :=E,,& [ L ( s t , u t , d t , t ) + v ( y t +~) l y t
This is actually the key equation for showing that the multi-step optimization problem (11) can be reduced to multiple single-step optihization problems. This is the subject of the developments that follow.
Optimal Cost-to-Go. prove next that ( p * , 6*) is a Nash equilibrium because these policies satisfy (1). Because of (15) y E y , Plr*,p (yo = y) > 0, for sequences of length 0, from which Jt.* = J,U.6. follows because of (16) and (13) . This concludes the proof of the first inequality in (1). The second inequality can be proved similarly using (19) and reversing the roles of the players. 
